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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a critical analysis of the contemporary policy focus on promoting 
employability among young people in the UK.  Drawing on analysis of UK policy approaches to 
tackling youth unemployment since the late 1970s, we suggest existing critiques of 
employability as 'supply-side orthodoxy' fail to capture fully its evolving meaning and function. 
Under the UK Coalition Government, it has been increasingly colonised as a tool of neoliberal 
governance to legitimise ever more punitive forms of conditional welfare. We argue that this 
colonisation undermines the value of the notion of employability as an academic tool for 
understanding the reasons why young people face difficulties in entering the labour market. The 
paper suggests that the notion of youth transitions offers more potential for understanding 
youth unemployment, and that more clearly linking this body of research to policy could 
provide a fruitful avenue for future research.  Such a shift requires a longer term, spatially 
informed perspective as well as greater emphasis on the changing power relations that mediate 
young people's experiences of wider social and economic transformations.  The paper concludes 
that promoting employment among urban young people requires a marked shift to address the 
historically and geographically inadequate knowledge and assumptions on which policies are 
based.   
KEY WORDS: urban labour markets; youth unemployment; employability; youth transitions; 
urban policy; welfare reform. 
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Introduction 
 
Recent UK policies on youth unemployment have been underpinned by a static and simplistic 
notion of employability rooted in supply-side orthodoxy, which presents worklessness as a 
behavioural and cultural shortcoming among individuals (e.g. DWP, 2008, 2010; HM 
Government, 2011a, 2011b).  As a discourse it focuses on the relative employability of workless 
young people in explaining the difficulties they face in securing and maintaining a foothold in 
increasingly competitive urban labour markets.  This narrow, individualised conceptualisation 
of employability has been critiqued by those arguing for a broader notion which recognises the 
importance of geography and demand-side factors, such as the relative buoyancy of local labour 
markets (Lindsay and Houston, 2011; McQuaid and Lindsay, 2005).    
 
At the same time, from a youth studies tradition, the growing complexities of urban society have 
been increasingly cited by scholars researching urban youth unemployment as a central factor 
impacting negatively on the labour market opportunities of young people over time (Furlong 
and Cartmel, 2007; MacDonald and Marston, 2005, McDowell, 2002; Roberts, 2011; Thompson, 
2011).  They have drawn attention to the increasing complexity and non-linearity of youth 
transitions since the 1970s in accounting for the deterioration in labour market prospects, 
particularly among urban youth in the UK's cities.  Key processes here include 
deindustrialisation, labour market restructuring, the changing nature of post-compulsory 
education transitions, and an increasing individualization in the responses of young people 
which is deemed to have 'obscured the role of social structures in shaping life chances' 
(Thompson, 2011, p.790).  Taken together these academic endeavours have made important 
contributions to our understanding of urban youth unemployment in challenging the narrow 
supply-side focus of policymakers.  
 
In this paper we further build upon and critique the notion of employability informing policy.  In 
particular, we question its usefulness in understanding and diagnosing urban youth 
unemployment.  We suggest existing academic critiques of the conceptualisation of 
employability underpinning policy need to be cognisant of a distinct shift in the nature of labour 
market policy under the Coalition Government.  Analysis of policies on youth unemployment 
since the 1970s shows a gradual structural shift towards a more punitive regime characterised 
by increasing conditionality and benefit sanctions.  Until recently, this has been accompanied by 
'relief cycles' (Peck, 2001) where conditionality is largely intensified during periods of economic 
growth and eased during downturns.  We show how this cyclical pattern comes to an abrupt 
halt under the Coalition which has increased both the intensity and coverage of conditional forms 
of welfare applied to young people during a period of high youth unemployment. While 'creeping 
conditionality' (Dwyer and Wright, 2014) has been a feature of employment policy since the 
1980s, recent welfare reforms under the Coalition Government are distinguished by the extent 
to which young people have been the target of spending cuts, less generous benefits, tighter 
eligibility criteria and more punitive forms of welfare.  This is beginning to manifest itself in the 
emergence of a cohort of young people increasingly at risk of worklessness and poverty relative 
to older groups (MacInnes et al, 2013).  
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What's more, these processes and outcomes have occurred during a period in which young 
people are becoming ever more employable as indicated by levels of formal qualifications.  We 
suggest, therefore, that the notion of employability is more than simply a form of supply-side 
orthodoxy.  Rather it has been colonised as a form of discursive legitimisation for neoliberal 
policies which seek to reduce the costs of supporting young people while simultaneously 
compelling their engagement with "flexible" and insecure labour markets. This is likely to 
accentuate the difficulties faced by marginalised youth and contribute to their continued 
stigmatisation.  In this sense recent approaches to youth unemployment would seem to 
correspond to the notion of "neoliberal state-crafting" 'whereby governments purport to curb, 
contain, or reduce the very poverty that they have paradoxically spawned through economic 
deregulation, welfare retraction and revamping, and urban retrenchment' (Wacquant, 2013, 
p.41). 
 
For these reasons, we remain sceptical of academic attempts to "reclaim" the notion of 
employability by emphasising the importance of demand-side factors.  In seeking alternatives, 
we consider the concept of youth transitions.  This literature seeks to widen the debate, from 
one dominated by behavioural economics and labour market studies, by acknowledging the 
importance of longer-term social change and its impact on the youth segment.  While there is an 
important and growing evidence base on the outcomes of 'the coincidence of a series of 
economic changes' (McDowell, 2002, p.39) that have significantly altered opportunities for 
young people - and particularly those towards the bottom of the class structure - few accounts 
have sought to explain the longer-term urban processes contributing to these differential 
outcomes across space: 
 
'despite much research interest in youth transitions, the interactions among a series of 
cultural, institutional, familial, economic, and political changes and their attendant impacts at 
this extended stage of the life-course have, to date, not been systematically described' 
(Roberts, 2011, p.25).   
 
Though a systematic description of the kind advocated by Roberts is beyond the scope of this 
paper, an implicit and secondary contribution is to point towards the potential linkage between 
youth transitions research and policy through a broader political economy of welfare.  We 
suggest that a revision of the concept represents a fruitful avenue for the youth studies research 
agenda.  Such an approach, following Cote (2014), places greater emphasis on institutional and 
political change, the power relations in which young people are embedded and how these 
change over time alongside wider social and spatial processes in explaining the labour market 
marginalisation of some young people: the least powerful.  Indeed, our primary focus here is on 
those at the bottom of the class structure who find themselves in a much weaker position 
relative to previous generations and also to their middle-class peers.  These young people are 
invariably: the marginalised section of the youth cohort for whom middle-class notions of 
individualization as an empowering force do not hold true given their relative lack of access to 
economic, political and cultural capital (Bright, 2011; Skeggs, 2004; Lawler, 2005; Willis, 2014); 
an increasingly stigmatised group facing widespread contempt (Skeggs, 2009) and 'diminished 
levels of empathy from the middle-classes' (Vertigans, 2015); and are therefore deemed to 
warrant a targeted approach by the techniques of welfare conditionality due to their perceived 
individual, cultural and moral inadequacies (Kennedy, 2014).  That said, though the tropes of 
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employability are focused on this group, the effects resonate across a wider youth cohort 
including unemployed graduates for instance. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. Firstly, we explore the concept of 
employability as it specifically relates to youth unemployment and the notion of increasingly 
complex youth transitions.  This critical, cross-disciplinary academic literature highlights a 
disjuncture between empirical evidence and the simplified and individualised concept of 
employability characteristic of policy assumptions.  In the second section we examine labour 
market activation policies since the late 1970s and recent welfare reforms targeted at workless 
youth.  This analysis highlights the way in which these have, in combination, become 
increasingly punitive and dis-embedded from 'relief cycles' which have historically exhibited a 
more expansive and ameliorative policy approach during periods of economic decline or 
stagnation (Peck, 2001; Piven and Cloward, 1971).  We also present time series data at the city-
region level on the employment status and educational levels of young people in England's core 
cities.  This illustrates how more punitive forms of workfare have been implemented precisely 
at the time young people are becoming more employable as measured by formal academic 
qualifications. Despite this, levels of employment have fallen, which undermines the link 
between employability and employment.  Thirdly, drawing on this evidence, we problematise 
the simplistic notion of employability, in terms of both academic and policy discourses, and 
advocate a longer-term, dynamic and theoretically-informed approach in understanding youth 
labour market disadvantage.  We conclude that approaches to tackling unemployment among 
urban young people require a marked shift to address the historically and geographically 
inadequate knowledge and assumptions on which policies are based.   
 
Urban youth unemployment, employability and youth transitions 
 
It is important to situate policies and narratives of youth unemployment within the wider 
context of the problematisation of urban youth more broadly.  Urban youth have long occupied 
an ambivalent position within UK society (Cohen, 2002; Pearson, 1983).  This translates into the 
differential treatment and targeting of some young adults within public space and policy more 
broadly: 'residual youth groupings, including the young unemployed, homeless, poor and often 
those from ethnic backgrounds, are excluded, segregated, incorporated, policed and in some 
cases literally "swept off the streets"' (Chatterton and Hollands, 2003, p.88).  In recent years 
notions of a lack of self-restraint and consideration for others among young people, often linked 
to deficient parenting and readily located within inner city areas, have been central to the 
plethora of policies and interventions to emerge under anti-social behaviour legislation (Flint 
and Powell, 2012; Law and Mooney, 2013; Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2012; Rodger, 
2008).  This conflation of the behavioural roots of urban disorder with the moral deficiencies 
seen to contribute to youth unemployment has the effect of spatialising the latter as a distinctly 
urban problem.  Such tendencies are reinforced by the less controversial observation that youth 
unemployment remains concentrated in some of Britain's less buoyant towns and cities 
(Crowley and Cominetti, 2014) and consistently higher in urban than rural areas - even if the 
gap is closing (Commission for Rural Communities, 2012). Evidently, most policies on youth 
unemployment are determined, and applied, nationally and youth unemployment cannot be 
conceived purely as an urban problem.  However, both discursively and empirically, it tends to 
retain a distinctly urban emphasis in policy terms. These wider developments in urban 
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governance are crucial to understanding the position of, and policy approaches to, workless 
young people as they give rise to the particular framing of youth unemployment and 
employability within urban policy along behavioural and cultural lines.  
 
The policy realm of youth unemployment is particularly susceptible to heightened public fears 
and anxieties related to the perceived threat to the social order presented by a mass of 
unemployed among the youth ranks (Fergusson and Yeates, 2014).  For example, the urban 
riots and disorder in English cities in 2011 were followed by proclamations about the loss of 
work ethic among a "lost generation" of urban youth as part of a narrative of social malaise and 
moral decline in which "cultures of worklessness" form a central component (DCLG, 2012; Flint 
and Powell, 2012; Slater, 2014).  This narrative revolves around long-standing discourses of 
"dependency" that individualise the problem of unemployment and wider worklessness (Crisp, 
2009; Fraser and Gordon, 1994; MacDonald and Marston, 2005; Patrick, 2014; Peck and 
Theodore, 2000; Schram, 2000; Shildrick et al., 2012).  
 
In the 1980s, the rhetoric of the New Right in the UK Ǯtransmuted social issues like unemployment into moral problemsǯ and the focus shifted to an Ǯintensification of the tendency to personalize unemploymentǯ ȋCole, ʹͲͲͺ, p.͵ʹȌ.  This phenomenon is also evident across 
Western neoliberal societies (Fraser and Gordon, 1994; Peck, 2001; Wacquant, 2008) and is 
central to an emergent global youth unemployment discourse (Fergusson and Yeates, 2013, 
2014).  A key assumption underpinning labour market policy in the UK (and beyond) since the 
1980s, then, is the notion that large sections of the workless population lack the values and 
behaviours deemed necessary to fulfil the societal obligation of work.  Empirical research shows 
such characterisations apply particularly to young people not in employment, education or 
training ("NEETs") (Lawy et al., 2009). However, we suggest that employability discourses are 
increasingly targeted and classed, informed by the widespread and seemingly relentless 
negative representations of workless urban youth1 (Pickard, 2014).  
 
This discursive construction of the problem of unemployment as one of individual shortcomings 
has been accompanied by a shift from a focus on the individual’s right to a decent standard of 
living - characteristic of the post-war settlement - to the individual’s responsibility to society and a change in the notion of Ǯentitlementsǯ ȋDwyer, ͳͻͻͺ; Flint, ʹͲͲͻ; Peck, ʹͲͲͳ; Peck and 
Theodore, 2000).  Central to this is a switch in understanding from unemployment as a 
structural condition explained by a lack of employment to an individual problem caused by a 
lack of employability (McQuaid and Lindsay, 2005; Peck and Theodore, 2000).  McQuaid and 
Lindsay (2005) show that the concept of employability has a long genealogy, with several 
changes in meaning discernible over time.  In recent years, however, it has come to signify a 
"supply-side orthodoxy" (McQuaid and Lindsay, 2005:  p204) that unemployment is explained 
by the deterioration of skills, work habits and commitment among individuals over time (see 
also Theodore, 2007).  In relation to youth, this narrow characterisation has generated a new 
policy orthodoxy among policymakers and some academics which posits that: 'Unemployment, 
by and large, is a product of the low skills and aspirations of the young unemployed.  Problems 
of young people becoming NEET or trapped in poor-quality jobs can be solved by "up-skilling"' 
(MacDonald, 2011: 434).  Our focus here is on a wider youth cohort, broadly defined as those 
                                            
1 For example, see the recent special issue of Sociological Research Online on representations of the poor 
(Volume 19 Issue 3): http://www.socresonline.org.uk/index_by_issue.html 
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young people in urban areas whose everyday lives defy their static characterisation as NEET, 
underemployed etc. Rather, we refer in particular to the youth population that finds it 
increasingly difficult to secure and maintain employment and who may move regularly between 
discursive categories; itself a factor in their representation as "chaotic", or "lacking the habits of 
work" (i.e. employability). 
 
The policy logic of focussing on employability invites Ǯsupply-side interventions towards 
activating underemployed segments of the labour force through training, job-readiness 
programming and unemployment benefit reforms that encourage (and increasingly compel) rapid entry into workǯ (Theodore, 2007, p.929). Furthermore, it legitimises conditionality as a 
necessary tool to activate passive welfare recipients in order that they fulfil their responsibility 
to look for work (Dwyer, 1998; Peck, 2001; Patrick 2012).  Accordingly, labour market policies 
have increasingly focused on the "responsibilisation" of welfare recipients, with urban youth a 
particular target for successive UK governments (Law and Mooney, 2013).  Peck (2001) argues 
these changes can be understood as a shift in the regime of regulation from one of 'welfare' to 
'workfare'.  For Peck, workfare can be understood as a distinct political response to the need to 
create a ready supply of workers for the low-paid and contingent work that has emerged in the 
wake of economic restructuring: 'workfare is not about creating jobs for people that donǯt have them; it is about creating workers for jobs that nobody wantsǯ (Peck, 2001, p.6).  Peck draws on 
Piven and Cloward (1971) to suggest this systemic change in the institutional architecture and 
rationale of labour market policy has been paralleled by successive 'relief cycles' where punitive 
policies are eased during an economic downturn and then ratcheted up during an upswing.  The 
logic is that expectations to find work can be reasonably increased as job opportunities become 
more plentiful, not least because jobseekers might otherwise become too discerning in whether 
to take up less attractive opportunities.  Thus workfare has both structural and cyclical 
dimensions. 
 
The narrow conception of employability underpinning this shift to conditional, workfarist forms 
of "welfare" has come under sustained criticism.  McQuaid and Lindsay (2005, p.207) argue for 
a broader conceptualisation that understands employability as 'being derived from, and affected 
by, individual characteristics and circumstances and broader, external (social, institutional and economicȌ factors that influence a personǯs ability to get a job'.  External factors include: the 
attitudes of employers towards the unemployed; the supply and quality of training and 
education; the availability of other assistance for disadvantaged job-seekers; the extent to which 
the tax-benefits system successfully eliminates "benefit traps"; and (most importantly) the 
supply of appropriate jobs in the local economy.  This introduces demand-side considerations 
into the notion of employability and suggests that it is the interrelationship between demand- 
and supply-side factors that explains employability.  The adequacy of this broader 
conceptualisation for understanding the situation of young people in the labour market is, 
arguably, only partial however.  Addressing demand-side factors as part of the concept of 
employability recognises the importance of geography in terms of local labour market 
conditions, as numerous commentators advocate (Beatty et al., 2010; Keep and Mayhew, 2010; 
McQuaid and Lindsay, 2005; Theodore, 2007).  But it still neglects historical processes, the 
salience of class and power relations in contributing to uneven labour market opportunities.  
These shortcomings have been acknowledged, to some extent, in the youth transitions literature. 
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There is a growing consensus that changes in school to work transitions have become 
increasingly fractured and more complex since the 1970s with young people dependent on the 
family and state for longer periods (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007; MacDonald, 2011; McDowell, 
2002; Roberts, 2011; Thompson, 2011; Yates et al., 2011).  Reasons include the expansion of 
full-time places in higher and further education, the raising of the school-leaving age, and the 
collapse of the traditional rapid entry into employment in manufacturing and heavy industry 
within post-industrial cities (Pollock, 1997; Yates et al., 2011).  In the mid-1970s 'two-thirds of 
teenagers went straight into employment at age 16, at the end of the 1990s less than one in ten 
16 year-olds looked for work as they completed compulsory schooling' (McDowell, 2002, p.42).  
Thompson (2011, p.789) argues that policymakers reduce the growing complexity of school to 
work transitions to a problem to be addressed at the individual level: 'Low attainment, 
restricted aspirations, and negative attitudes and behaviours are essentialised, regarded as 
properties of young people, families and communities, rather than as consequences of structural 
inequality' (see also Bright, 2011).  In other words, the fragmentation of youth transitions is 
reduced to the very same supply-side orthodoxies underpinning narrower conceptualisations of 
employability.    Moreover, the notion of more complex transitions since the "golden age" of the 
1960s and early 1970s has also been challenged recently (Goodwin and O'Connor, 2005).  We 
return to the issue of youth transitions in the discussion section below. 
 
 
Youth unemployment, active labour market policies and welfare reform  
 
This section presents an empirical examination of policies designed to tackle youth 
unemployment, as well as wider welfare reforms that affect the entitlement of young people to 
out-of-work benefits.  Our primary concern here lies with exploring the norms and assumptions 
underpinning policy as well as how the timing and frequency of key reforms interacts with 
changing levels of youth unemployment. The analysis below underpins our assertion that 
policies on youth unemployment have experienced a qualitative shift under the Coalition 
Government as levels of conditionality have been increased and intensified at a time of high 
youth unemployment. 
Table 1 below details a series of labour market initiatives to tackle youth unemployment since 
the late 1970s.  It shows both dedicated active labour market programmes (ALMPs) specifically 
targeting young people, as well as broader welfare reforms that have increased levels of 
conditionality attached to receipt of some out-of-work benefits.  
Table 1: Youth labour market activation and welfare reform measures, 1978-2014. 
Initiative (date 
introduced) 
Administration Eligibility Key features Main elements of 
conditionality 
Youth Opportunities 
Programme (YOP) 
(1978) 
Labour 
(Callaghan) 
School leavers 
aged 16-18 
12 months work 
experience and training 
for unemployed school 
leavers. 
None  
Youth Training 
Scheme (1983) 
Conservative 
(Thatcher) 
School leavers 
aged 16-17 
Replaced YOP. Two year 
programme combining 
training with work 
experience (later 
rebranded Youth 
None formally but removal of 
eligibility of 16-17 year-olds for 
Unemployment Benefit in 1988 
meant Youth Training Scheme 
effectively became the only way 
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Training in 1990).  for the young unemployed to 
secure out-of-work income. 
Restart (1986) Conservative 
(Thatcher)  
All claimants 
unemployed for 
six months. 
Mandatory 'Restart' 
Interview after six 
months unemployment 
to review jobsearch 
activity. Participants 
could also be mandated 
onto Restart Courses to 
improve employability. 
Restart interviews and courses 
were mandatory. Maximum 
period of benefit 
disqualification for failure to 
comply was extended to 13 
weeks from 6 weeks (later 
increased to 26 weeks in 1988) 
Social Security Acts 
(1988 and 1989 )  
 Conservative 
(Thatcher) 
Various Introduced lower 
payments for single 
benefit claimants under 
25 without children.  
Claimants now required to 
attend Job Centres on weekly 
basis to demonstrate actively 
looking for work. 
Introduction of 
Jobseekers 
Allowance (1995) 
 Conservative 
(Major) 
 Merged Unemployment 
Benefit and Income 
Support into single 
benefit; introduced 
Jobseeker's Agreements 
and fortnightly reviews 
of jobsearch activities. 
 
Benefit sanctions for failing to 
look for work, leaving jobs 
voluntarily or due to 
misconduct, and refusing to 
attend courses or comply with 
Jobseeker's Directions. 
New Deal for Young 
People (18-24) 
(1998) 
Labour 
(Blair) 
18-24 year olds 
in receipt of JSA 
for six months. 
'Gateway period' of 
intensive jobsearch 
followed by 
participation in one of 
four options:  a 
subsidised job; a place 
on the Environment 
Task Force; a place with 
a voluntary sector 
employer; full-time 
education or training.  
 
 
Mandatory referral after six 
months on JSA and sanctions for 
failure to comply. 
Work Focused 
Interviews for Lone 
parents (2001) and 
Lone Parent 
Obligations (2008) 
 
 
'New' Labour 
(Blair/Brown) 
Lone parents in 
receipt of Income 
Support 
Lone parents required 
to attend periodic Work 
Focused Interviews. 
Lone Parent Obligations 
implemented 
incremental reduction 
in age threshold of 
youngest child that 
enables lone parent to 
qualify for Income 
Support rather than 
more conditional JSA.  
 
Lone Parent Obligation regime 
sees lone parents moved on to 
JSA with mandatory 
requirements to look for work 
once youngest child reaches age 
12 (2009) and then 10 (2010). 
Employment Support 
Allowance (2008)  
 
'New' Labour 
(Brown) 
Affected all new 
claimants of out-
of-work benefits 
on grounds of 
sickness or 
disability. All 
existing receipts 
of Incapacity 
Benefit migrated 
across onto ESA. 
Following Work 
Capability Assessment 
(WCA) a majority of 
claimants are assigned to ǮWork Related 
Activity Group (WRAG). 
Those placed in the WRAG 
receive a lower level of ESA and 
are required to engage in work 
related activity. 
Future Jobs Fund 
(2009) and Young 
Person's Guarantee 
(2010) 
'New' Labour  
(Brown) 
Young people 
(18–24 year olds) 
who had reached 
at least six 
months on Jobseekerǯs 
Allowance (JSA). 
Future Jobs Fund (FJF) 
created subsidised jobs 
for six months in the 
public or third sector. In 
2010, the FJF became 
part of the Young Personǯs Guarantee 
The YPG was initially offered on 
a voluntary basis to those who had been claiming jobseekerǯs 
allowance (JSA) for more than 
six months, but became 
compulsory in 2010 for those 
claiming for more than 10 
10 
 
 (YPG), which offered all 
18-24 year olds 
reaching the six month 
point of a JSA claim a 
job, training or work 
experience. 
 
  
months. 
Work Programme 
(2011) 
Conservative - 
Lib Dem 
Coalition 
government 
(Cameron) 
Young people 
aged 18-24 who 
have been 
receiving Jobseekerǯs 
Allowance for 
nine months 
(those aged 25 or 
over are placed 
on the 
programme after 
twelve months)  
 
Range of back-to-work 
support delivered by 
private and third sector 
organisations.  
Participation is mandatory and 
providers can apply sanctions 
for non-compliance 
Mandatory Work 
Activity (2011) 
Conservative - 
Lib Dem 
Coalition 
government 
(Cameron) 
Claimants aged 
18 and over 
deemed by 
Jobcentre Plus 
advisers deemed 
to have 'little or 
no understanding 
of what 
behaviours are 
required to 
obtain and keep 
work'  
Work placement or 
work-related activity 
for up to 30 hours a 
week over a four-week 
period. 
Failure to complete a 
Mandatory Work Activity 
placement without good cause 
results in the imposition of 
sanctions  
Youth Contract Conservative - 
Lib Dem 
Coalition 
government 
(Cameron) 
Unemployed JSA 
claimants aged 
18-24 
Includes offer of Work 
Experience or sector-
based work academy 
place for every 
unemployed 18-24 year 
old; extra Personal 
Adviser time from 
month three; and a 
careers interview in the 
first three months of a 
claim. 
 
Participants required to 'sign 
on' weekly rather than 
fortnightly from month five of a 
JSA claim.  
Revised Lone Parent 
Obligations 
(2012/13/14) 
Conservative - 
Lib Dem 
Coalition 
government 
(Cameron) 
Lone parents 
claiming income 
support or ESA 
Age of youngest child at 
which lone parents 
must actively seek work 
reduced from seven to 
five. 
 
Lone parents with a 
child aged between one 
and five required to 
attend Work Focused 
Interviews. 
 
(From 2014) Lone 
parents with a child  
over one can be 
mandated to attend the 
Jobcentre more 
frequently. Once the 
child reaches three lone 
Failure to comply can lead to 
sanctions 
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Sources: Clasen (2011); Dwyer et al. (2014); Dwyer and Wright (2014); Fletcher (1997); Kennedy, (2014); 
and Patrick (2014); Peck (2001); Trickey and Walker, (2001); Van Reenan (2004); Watts et al. (2014). 
 
The analysis shows how the policy trajectory since the late 1970s displays three clear and 
interrelated trends: a near exclusive focus on addressing youth unemployment through supply-
side interventions to improve employability; growing levels of conditionality to enforce 
attachment to the labour market; and differential treatment of young people relative to other 
age cohorts. Nearly every single major initiative is premised upon the 'supply-side orthodoxy' 
that interventions to tackle worklessness should largely focus on improving employability 
through individual behavioural change by raising the skills, aspirations and work-readiness of 
young people out of work.  The single notable exception is the £680m Future Jobs Fund 
programme implemented by the Labour Government in 2009, which sought to create 
temporary jobs for young people by subsidising six month posts in public and third sector 
organisations.  
 
These supply-side policies have been underpinned by growing levels of conditionality which can 
be observed through a number of policy shifts.  Mandatory Restart interviews in 1986 marked a 
key departure from a more passive policy regime based on 'absorption' (Convery, 2009, p.4) of 
surplus labour through largely voluntary training and work experience programmes (also Peck, 
2001; Watts, 2014).  However, Conservative administrations shied away from consolidating this 
into more systematic forms of workfare, partly in response to the rising unemployment in the 
1990s which made it unpalatable to implement 'US-imported workfare' (Clasen, 2011, p.29) 
parents can also be 
instructed to carry out 
Work Related Activity.  
 
Universal Credit 
(2012) 
Conservative - 
Lib Dem 
Coalition 
government 
(Cameron) 
Future recipients 
of Universal 
Credit will 
include the 
majority of 
benefit claimant 
groups as well 
partners of those 
receiving income 
based 
JSA or in the 
WRAG group of 
ESA. 
 
Replaces six existing 
payments for working 
age people (Income 
Support, Income- Based Jobseekerǯs 
Allowance, Income-
Related Employment 
Support Allowance, 
Housing Benefit, Child 
Tax Credit and Working 
Tax Credit). The ǲstandard allowancesǳ 
within UC are lower for 
the under 25s than for 
those aged 25 and over.  
Individual 'Claimant 
Commitments' increase job 
seeking expectations for most 
claimants with default 
requirement that claimants 
treat job seeking as a full time 
job. Claimants of UC on low 
income are also subject to 
conditionality for first time to 
increase earnings. 
Enhanced sanctions 
regime (2012)  
Conservative - 
Lib Dem 
Coalition 
government 
(Cameron) 
Claimants of 
Jobseekers 
Allowance and 
Employment 
Support 
Allowance 
Maximum sanction for 
JSA claimants for 
repeated non-
compliance increased to 
complete withdrawal of 
benefits for three years  
 
Sanctionable 
component of benefit 
also increased for 
claimants in WRAG 
group of ESA who fail to 
comply with conditions. 
As detailed in previous column. 
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that lacked wider support among the electorate.  This changed with the implementation of the 
New Deal for Young People (NDYP) under New Labour which represented the first 
comprehensive national programme of mandatory work-related activities for young claimants 
of JSA (Clasen, 2011; Peck, 2001; Trickey and Walker, 2011).  
 
Conditionality has continued to increase since then in terms of both coverage and intensity. 
Successive governments have extended conditionality to hitherto exempt groups including: lone 
parents with the introduction of Work Focussed Interviews (WFIs) in 2001; the sick and 
disabled with the implementation of Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) in 2008; and 
those on low incomes now expected to increase earnings to meet minimum income thresholds 
under Universal Credit (UC) from 2013 onwards.  Dwyer and Wright (2014) argue these latest 
requirements imposed on those in work and their partners - to earn a minimum income under 
UC - signify a category shift from a regime of 'creeping conditionality' under New Labour to one 
of 'ubiquitous conditionality' under the Coalition Government (see also Watts et al., 2014).  The 
intensity of conditionality has also increased for young people through the additional 
mandatory conditions imposed under UC, the enhanced sanctions regime and changes to the 
expectations placed on lone parents. 
  
One recurrent feature of welfare reforms is the differential treatment of young people who have 
consistently faced less generous entitlements and been subject to more stringent forms of 
conditionality than other jobseekers (Kennedy, 2014). Individuals under 25 receive lower 
'standard' allowances for JSA and UC and are also ineligible for Working Tax Credits unless they 
have a child or disability (although UC will see them entitled to in-work benefits for the first 
time).  Moreover, 18-24 year-olds are mandated onto the Work Programme three months 
earlier than those over 25.  This differential treatment within benefit and welfare-to-work 
systems has been legitimised on the, largely un-evidenced, basis that younger people are often 
supported financially by parents; have lower living costs; and, tellingly, need the highest levels 
of incentivisation to find work (Kennedy, 2014). 
 
These labour market reforms have also been combined with reforms in other policy areas that 
have tightened eligibility to benefits and other resources for young people. The Local Housing 
Allowance (LHA) changes introduced in 2008 (by the Labour administration) restricted 
entitlements to Housing Benefit for people under 25 to the lower shared accommodation rate; 
and subsequent reforms in 2011 reduced  entitlements from the 50th to the 30th percentile of 
market rents in Broad Rental Market Areas (see Beatty et al., 2014 for full details).  Moreover, 
the total withdrawal of Housing Benefit for those aged under 21 (and potentially extending to 
those under 24) was recently announced by David Cameron (House of Commons, 2015).  These 
reforms have served to restrict access to the rental market for young people on Housing Benefit 
(Beatty et al., 2014), especially in high demand areas where labour markets tend to be stronger, 
thereby reducing their mobility.  Young people are also increasingly channelled to sub-standard 
Housing of Multiple Occupation as a result, with increasing evidence of "hidden homelessness" 
as many are reduced to "sofa surfing" (Beatty et al., 2014).  At the same time, rising housing 
prices and more limited access to mortgage finance in the wake of the financial crisis have 
further restricted access to home ownership for "Generation Rent", leaving them more reliant 
on the private rented sector (Jessop and Humphrey, 2014).  In England, the increase in 
University tuition fees has also left young people leaving higher education facing significant 
sums to repay on student loans during their working lifetimes. Furthermore, Education 
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Maintenance Allowance was abolished alongside cuts to the Area Based Grant, affecting 
Connexions, the Youth Opportunities Fund and the Youth Capital Fund (ibid.).  Toynbee and 
Walker (2015) also note that it is the over 65s that have had their pensions and perks (e.g. 
winter fuel allowances, free TV licences and free bus travel) protected under austerity; while 
young people have experienced cuts in services, falling incomes, rising rents and diminishing 
prospects of owning their own homes  This combination of unprecedented retrenchment has 
prompted some commentators to decry the 'pinch' (Willetts, 2012) or 'jilted generation' 
(Howker and Malik, 2013) of young people who have borne the brunt of 'austerity' measures 
compared to older groups.  For disadvantaged young people lacking financial and parental 
support the message from the state seems to be: "you're on your own". 
What emerges, therefore, is a clear picture of young people out of work facing growing levels of 
conditionality through welfare-to-work programmes and the benefit system. It illustrates how 
policies on youth unemployment are underpinned by a narrow conception of employability 
focusing on improving the motivation, skills and work-related experience of young people. The 
result is that young people now face the most stringent requirements ever to look for work in the 
post-war period.  The intensification of conditionality has occurred over several decades but 
there have been distinct cycles within this period.  Until recently, this followed Peck's (2001) 
observation that the UK has experienced a longer-term structural consolidation of workfare, but 
that key developments have tended to occur during more buoyant economic conditions: 
 
'there is a long-established relationship between economic cycles and shifts in welfare 
policy (Piven and Cloward, 1971). Whilst there is strong evidence in the United 
Kingdom of a cumulative, and perhaps structural, transition toward benefit 
conditionality and work programming, as creeping compulsion has been accompanied 
by creeping workfarism (Jones, 1996), there are also indications of Piven-Cloward 
cycles. So, the more radical reform measures have tended to occur in the context of 
falling unemployment, first in the post-1986 downswing (e.g. Restart in 1986, the 
Social Security Act of 1988, and TECs in 1988) and subsequently in the post-1993 
downswing (e.g. the JSA proposals of 1994, Project Work in 1995, and the New Deal in 
1997)'. 
However, this relationship between more radical welfare reform and economic context has 
begun to unravel under the Coalition Government.  Two significant pieces of evidence support 
this.  First, Figure 1 below shows the timing of key welfare and labour market policy reforms 
against changes in levels of youth unemployment.  Both the JSA claimant count and the wider 
Annual Population Survey (APS) count of youth unemployment are illustrated.  Claimant count 
data is useful for showing long-term trends given the availability of time-series data back to 
1986.  It has become a less accurate indicator of youth unemployment, however, given the 
growing numbers of young people who are out of work and looking for work, but not claiming 
JSA.  For this reason, unemployment counts from the APS are also presented as these include 
young people who choose not to claim (or have been temporarily mandated off JSA), but 
nonetheless are out of work and looking for employment.  The figure shows key changes on the 
JSA claimant count line until it peaks in 2011, with remaining changes displayed on the APS 
count line which peaks later in 2012 (dotted lines indicate where the change would fall on the 
claimant count line). 
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(Figure 1 here) 
 
The figure illustrates that, under the Coalition Government, policy has become dis-embedded 
from long-term 'relief cycles' whereby conditionality tends to increase during periods of 
economic growth.  There is a noticeable bunching of seven different reforms between 2011-13 
at a time when the APS measure was peaking and then falling slightly.  This contrasts noticeably 
with pre-Coalition Government reforms which were less frequent and far more likely to be 
introduced during extended periods of declining unemployment.  Whilst the diagram should 
only be read as a figurative illustration of the relationship between reform and economic 
context, it remains striking how the Coalition, contra to all previous administrations, has 
displayed palpable zeal for intensifying punitive reforms at precisely the time that youth 
unemployment peaks.  This represents a fundamental departure from historical policy 
approaches.   
A second observation relating to levels of sanctioning supports this notion of growing levels of 
conditionality during the economic downturn and nascent phase of recovery.  Recent figures 
show young people account for a disproportionate number of sanctions: 41 per cent of all 
sanctions issued under the new regime from October 2012 to December 2013 (Watts et al., 
2014).  Furthermore, recent research for the housing charity Crisis found that 'the sanction rate 
for 18-24 year olds in 2013/14 was more than double the rate for 45-49 year olds and triple the 
rate for over 60s for both JSA and ESA claimants' (Beatty et al., 2015, p.21).  18-24 year olds 
account for just over a quarter of the claimant count but almost two-fifths of all sanctions.  
Sanctioning is now a significant risk for an under-25 JSA claimant, affecting eight per cent of 
claimants in this age group per month in 2010–11 (averaged over the financial year), and rising 
to 8.4 per cent in 2013–14 (part-year)  (ibid.).  Commentators suggest these levels reflect 
Ministerial directive and policy change given that rises in sanctioning in 2010-11 occurred 
whilst the economy remained weak and advisers might have been expected to ease up on levels 
of sanctions (Webster, 2014).  In other words, there has been a deliberate and systematic 
political/ideological drive to increase punitive sanctions at a time when young people find it 
hardest to secure employment.  
 
These findings regarding increases in conditionality and sanctioning are all the more striking 
when set against data on the employability of young people in urban areas as indicated by 
formal qualifications. Figure 2 below shows: the proportion of young people with Level 4 
qualifications and higher2; and those with no qualifications in seven Local Enterprise 
Partnership (LEP) areas3 benchmarked against all young people in England.  
 
                                            
2 In the UK 'Level 4 and higher' qualifications include the higher national diploma (HND), degree and 
higher degree level (Masters or doctorate) qualifications or equivalent. 
3 These data were collated as part of an evaluation of the Big Lottery Fund's Talent Match Programme, 
which is a £108m youth unemployment project delivered across the 21 Local Economic Partnership (LEP) 
areas in England.  The data shown is for LEPs covering the core cities of England (Birmingham, Leeds, 
Liverpool, London, Manchester, Newcastle and Nottingham); Bristol is not included as it is not one of the 
21 Talent Match areas. The geography of LEPs is variable but is intended, at least in theory, to represent 
functional economic growth regions and therefore takes into consideration travel to work areas, for 
example. 
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(Figure 2 here) 
 
It shows two clear trends. First, there are increases in the proportion of young people with 
Level 4 or higher qualifications at both England and LEP level. Second, and perhaps most 
significantly, the proportion of young people with no qualifications has fallen across both scales 
with urban areas narrowing the gap with England to less than a percentage point by 2013.  One 
implication is that policymakers have been applying ever more punitive forms of conditionality 
to young people at precisely the same time they are striving to make themselves more 
"employable".  This includes those who are most distanced from the labour market as measured 
by formal qualifications.  The finding begins to undermine the discursive construction of youth 
unemployment as a problem of employability which, in turn, destabilises the legitimisation of 
growing conditionality in the welfare system. Rising levels of sanctions certainly seem less easy 
to defend in the face of clear evidence of an increasingly well-educated cohort of urban youth. 
 
Policymakers could argue, of course, that growing levels of credentials are indicative of the 
success of more conditional forms of welfare that cajole younger people to participate more 
actively in training and education.  In other words, mandation is paying off in terms of higher 
levels of employability than might otherwise be the case.  Even if true, however, this argument 
pays no heed to employment outcomes which display some worrying trends as Figure 3 shows. 
It indicates that the increase in employability as measured by formal qualifications has not 
arrested the declining employment levels of young people.  The proportion of young people in 
employment fell and then plateaued in city-regions and England overall since the economic 
crisis in 2007.  During the same period the proportion which is unemployed or in full-time 
education has risen.  Rising levels of credentials, including shrinking numbers of young people 
with no qualifications in urban labour markets, have not therefore been enough to reverse 
falling rates of employment.  Whilst growing participation in education may have many positive 
aspects, MacDonald (2011, p.434) posits that expanded further and higher education may also 
be performing the same 'warehousing' function that disguised youth unemployment through 
youth training schemes in the 1980s.  The data presented here appears to corroborate such a 
claim. This growing disjuncture between rising levels of formal qualifications and declining 
levels of participation in employment may ultimately reflect local labour conditions.  As iterated 
earlier, policies on youth unemployment focused on employability have been largely impervious 
to differences in the geography of labour market demand.  The consequence is likely to be 
growing bottlenecks of increasingly qualified young people who are not in employment because 
of the inability of local labour markets to absorb them.  The implications of this are addressed in 
the discussion section below.   
 
(Figure 3 here) 
 
Discussion 
 
The preceding section has drawn attention to the way in which an increasingly narrow 
conception of employability has underpinned governmental policies towards urban youth 
unemployment and served to legitimate welfare reforms and increasing conditionality.  This 
very same concept also serves as an explanation for high levels of youth unemployment giving 
rise to a supply-side consensus which is increasingly globalised and perpetuated by 
international governmental organisations (Fergusson and Yeates, 2013, 2014).  In this section 
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we firstly reflect on the changing policy and governance function of employability as applied to 
urban youth unemployment and, secondly, on the theoretical concept of youth transitions as a 
framework for understanding youth unemployment.   We then make some tentative suggestions 
on the factors underpinning the differential treatment of young people in terms of welfare 
support. 
 
The evidence presented above shows policies on youth unemployment have become 
increasingly punitive at the very same time that young people are finding it more difficult to 
access sustainable employment.  Moreover, this acceleration of conditionality has also taken 
place across a time period when levels of formal qualifications have been increasing among 
young people, including those with very low skills in urban labour markets.  This has significant 
implications for our understanding of the notion of employability.  The critique of the 'supply-
side orthodoxy' embedded in conceptions of employability underpinning labour market policy 
is long-standing and well-evidenced.  Urban scholars have convincingly demonstrated that 
youth unemployment must be understood not only in the context of individual characteristics, 
but also local labour market demand.  This is an argument with which we fully concur.   
 
However, we would also suggest this critique is inadequate for understanding the persistent 
appeal of the notion of employability in the current era of economic crisis.  Until recently, the 
apparent 'relief cycles' that marked the relationship between policies on youth unemployment 
and economic change, indicate that successive governments were sensitive to the need to 'ease 
up' in harsher economic conditions.  The apparent rupture of this consensus under the Coalition 
cannot be accommodated in existing critiques.  The charge of 'supply-side orthodoxy' is largely 
a static critique levelled in terms of competing economic explanations.  As such, it is largely 
unable to explain recent political change and its dynamic relationship to economic context and 
wider public sentiment.  We argue, therefore, for a critique of employability which is historically 
informed to fully appreciate its changing rationalities and policy manifestations. 
 
We also contend that the evidence presented above points to the need for a fuller explanation of 
an apparent paradox: why has the notion of employability become further entrenched, and 
increasingly used to legitimise punitive reforms, at a time when it seems ever more ill-suited to 
explaining the economic marginalisation of young people in urban labour markets? 
Understanding this, we would argue, requires attention to the political economy of welfare in 
terms of  'the root causes and consequences of the positioning over time of the youth segment in 
relation to those (adults) in a given society with political and economic power' (Cote, 2014, p. 
527).  Our contention is that changes in contemporary policy on youth unemployment can be 
understood as a form 'neoliberal state-crafting' (Wacquant, 2013) driven by short-term, 
ideological knowledge.  In other words, it is not a rational response to economic change as 
embodied by previous relief cycles.  Rather, it is a more ambitious attempt to pursue a political 
project of austerity that uses the costs incurred by the state in containing the financial crisis as 
an opportunity to legitimise the pursuit of ideological goals, particularly in terms of reducing 
the costs of public spending on welfare (Blythe, 2013, Toynbee and Walker, 2015).  The 
disproportionate impact of welfare reforms on young people shows that the effects of austerity 
have not been evenly experienced.  Here Peck's (2012) notion of 'relational strategies' has 
resonance in terms of explaining how neoliberal states have offloaded the costs of the crisis 
onto more vulnerable areas and groups in protecting the interests of more powerful political 
and economic actors (see also Slater, 2014).  Urban youth, it would seem, are a comparatively 
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easy target in deciding where cuts in expenditure should fall; suggesting continuity in terms of 
the historical construction, targeting and governance of the urban "youth problem" (Pearson, 
1983).  Yet, there is also a significant departure in terms of outcomes.  Increasing disparities in 
the generosity of welfare for different cohorts by age are contributing to growing 
intergenerational polarisation in levels of worklessness and poverty with younger cohorts 
faring worst (Macinnes et al., 2014; also Toynbee and Walker, 2015). 
  
By closely studying the relationship between modes of governance and economic change in this 
way, we can begin to understand employability as more than just a tussle over the relative 
importance of supply- and demand-side explanations. Instead, it emerges as a flexible and 
mutating concept that can be used to legitimise a particular configuration of political responses 
at a range of governance levels.  We suggest an on-going need to analyse these shifts in content 
and function over time, and in far more detail than has been possible within the confines of this 
article.  This calls for 'linking changing forms of urban marginality with emerging modalities of 
state-crafting' (Wacquant, 2013, p.41) in understanding what is particular about the current 
period, but also in highlighting historical continuities.   
The preceding critique of employability also points, albeit tentatively, to the potential 
possibilities of linking youth transitionsǯ research to the policy domain in advancing the youth 
studies research agenda.  In doing so, we would suggest that it is fruitful to situate changing 
youth transitions within an alternative, longer-term reading of individualization (see Elias, 
2001).  The notion that the individualization process among the youth cohort suddenly becomes 
all pervasive from the 1970s is clearly problematic (Goodwin and O'Connor, 2005).  Rather, 
viewed in longer-term perspective, the shift to more complex youth transitions is but one 
symptom of the increasing distance between childhood and adulthood, a wider and longer-term 
process discernible across western societies over many centuries and supported by empiricism: 
'The more complex and differentiated adult society becomes, the more complex is the process of 
civilising transformation of the individual, and the longer it takes' (Elias, 2008, p.30 - our 
emphasis).  As urban society has become more and more differentiated 'the web of actions 
grows so complex and extensive, the effort to behave "correctly" within it' becomes ever greater 
(Elias, 2000, p.368) - a pressure applying to all members of society.  As such, the distance 
between childhood and adulthood lengthens as 'the requirements of societal membership 
become more demanding, so that childhood requires more time and effort in socialization and 
education prior to the achievement of adult status through entry into the workforce' (van 
Krieken, 2005, p.43). 
 
This then raises the question of what is particular about the contemporary period.  In today's 
urban societies the pace of change and increasing complexity are arguably greater than ever 
with the web of social interdependencies in which young people are enmeshed ever longer and 
more dense.  These trends are not even however, with the relative distance between childhood 
and adulthood (i.e. length of transition) dependent on the socialisation process undergone by 
young people and shaped by the urban context of their social/power relations (i.e. family, 
school, peer socialisation etc.).  For example, the "one-step transitions" from school to work in 
the 1960s and 1970s are more readily associated with working class youth, with different 
trajectories for the middle-classes with relatively more access to power resources (Furlong and 
Cartmel, 1997); and the work of Willis (2014 [1977]) and Bright (2011) informs of the 
neglected importance of peer and family socialisation in shaping the social worlds and choices 
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of youth (i.e. different processes of individualization).  Situating youth transitions within this 
wider theoretical context enables acknowledgement of the role of historical processes, 
socialization, class and interdependent power relations in contributing to different 
individualization processes, and therefore transitions. That is, the structuring effects of these 
social interdependencies are not uniform, rather the negative impact of longer term social 
processes on labour market opportunities impacts disproportionately on those young people at 
the bottom of the class structure (i.e. the least powerful) and results in their labour market 
marginalisation.  From this perspective, therefore, the task in hand in moving towards a more 
accurate diagnosis of youth unemployment is to historically and empirically explore the 
differentiated experiences of youth transitions with a much greater emphasis on shifting power 
relations and their relationship to social and economic transformations.  The critique of 
employability above that suggests linking the youth transitions framework to policy analyses 
may provide a more fruitful avenue for advancing debates in both youth unemployment and the 
wider field of youth studies. 
 
Finally, though a detailed explanation of the differential treatment of young people is beyond 
the scope of this paper, some tentative observations can be made.  Firstly, the 18-24 cohort is a 
politically weak one lacking representation, with only 44 percent voting in the 2010 General 
Election.  The unprecedented attack on youth could feasibly be viewed as a political strategy.  
Secondly, Stephen Vertigans' historically informed analysis of recent responses to "looked after 
children" points to a wider societal shift in attitudes and sentiments towards poverty and 
working class youth:  
 
'Middle-class engagement and support which was so noticeable during nineteenth-century 
attempts at child saving has diminished, while determining the poor to be tasteless, uneducated 
and immoral continues and is arguably more pervasive through extensive media intrusion and 
"poverty porn"' (2015, p.12).   
We are perhaps too close to these developments, temporally speaking, to be able to discern how 
far the present trajectory represents a decline in empathy towards the poor.  But ongoing 
support for welfare cuts among a majority of the UK population would certainly suggest a 
hardening of attitudes towards youth given the deleterious and disproportionate effects 
produced.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the best efforts of urban scholars the flawed and increasingly narrow policy concept of 
employability has been shown to be all pervasive in contemporary policy responses to youth 
unemployment in the UK.  Analysis of UK policy since the late 1970s shows a marked shift under 
the Coalition Government towards a more punitive approach in an economic downturn, 
marking a distinct break from the "relief cycles" of earlier periods.  This colonisation of the 
concept of employability and its function as a tool of neoliberal governance has, we argue, 
rendered it virtually useless as an analytical device for understanding youth unemployment - 
tainted as it is by short-term, ideological knowledge. Like other key watchwords of neoliberal 
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urban governance, such as "welfare dependency", the "underclass" and the "ghetto" (Fraser and 
Gordon, 1994; Wacquant, 2008), it has little purchase in explaining contemporary urban 
marginalisation.  However, it remains a legitimate object of academic analyses in terms of how it 
functions as a discursive formation to validate particular forms of neoliberal state-crafting. 
The scale of the youth unemployment problem is such that policy-makers require quick 
responses giving rise to a "retreat into the present" in terms of the diagnosis of the complex 
causes of youth unemployment.  While the concept of youth transitions marks a progression 
from that of employability, there remains a need to reframe the debate so that it places power at 
the centre of our understanding.  Of course, we need a more systematic understanding of the 
changes giving rise to increasingly complex transitions, but the central question is why some 
young people (invariably the least powerful) have found it more and more difficult to negotiate 
this complexity than others.  Such a question can only be answered, we would argue, through a 
framework which can account for historical change and its impact on the power relations in 
which young people are enmeshed, while also being sensitive to spatial difference.  In short, 
current understanding and policy requires a shift from a static, aspatial and individually-
focused explanation of (and response to) youth unemployment, towards a longer-term 
perspective focused on the relationship between social and economic transformation and the 
shifting social interdependencies of young people across time and space.  
 
Words: 8,439 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We are very grateful to Mike Danson and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments 
on an earlier draft of this article. We would also like to thank Duncan Adam as the team member 
on the Talent Match evaluation who prepared the data presented in Figures 2 and 3 above. 
 
20 
 
References 
 
 
Beatty C, Cole I, Powell R and Sanderson E (2014) Monitoring the impact of recent measures 
affecting Housing Benefit and Local Housing Allowances in the private rented sector: The response 
of landlords. London: DWP. 
 
Beatty C, Foden M, McCarthy L and Reeve, K (2015) Benefit Sanctions and Homelessness: A 
Scoping Report. London: Crisis. 
 
Beatty C, Fothergill S, Houston D and Powell R (2010) Women on incapacity benefits: New 
survey evidence from the UK., In Kemp, PA (ed) Social Protection for a Post-Industrial World. 
Mortsel: Intersentia, pp 115-138. 
 
Blythe, M. (2013) Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bright NG (2011) "Off the model": resistant spaces, school disaffection and "aspiration" in a 
former coal-mining community. Children's Geographies 9(1): 63-78. 
 
Chatteron P and Hollands R (2003) Urban Nightscapes. London: Routledge. 
 
Clasen J (2011) The United Kingdom: towards a working-age benefit system. In J Clasen and D. 
Clegg (eds) Regulating the risk of unemployment: National Adaptations to Post-Industrial Labour 
Markets in Europe. Oxford: OUP, pp 15-33. 
 
Cohen S (2002 [1972]) Folk Devils and Moral Panics. London: Routledge. 
 
Cole M (2008) Sociology contra government? The contest for the meaning of unemployment in 
UK policy debates. Work, employment and Society 22(1): 27-43. 
 
Commission for Rural Communities (2012)  Barriers to education,employment andtraining for 
young people in rural areas. Gloucester: Commission for Rural Communities. 
 
Convery P (2009) Welfare to Work - From Special Measures to 80 Per Cent Employment. Local 
Economy 24(1): 1-27.  
Cote JE (2014) Towards a political economy of youth.  Journal of Youth Studies 17 (4): 527-43. 
 
Crisp R (2009) Motivation, morals and justice: Discourses of worklessness in the welfare reform 
green paper. People, Place and Policy 2 (3): 172-185. 
 
Crowley, L and Cominetti, N (2014)  The geography of youth unemployment: a route map for 
change. Lancaster: the Work Foundation. 
 
Dannreuther, A. (2011) Youth Unemployment: A Policy Briefing. London.  
 
DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government) (2012) Listening to Troubled 
Families. Report, London, UK, July. 
 
DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) (2008) No-One Written off: Reforming Welfare to 
Reward Responsibility. London: DWP. 
 
DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) (2010) 21st Century Welfare. London: DWP. 
 
21 
 
Dwyer P (1998) Conditional citizens? Welfare rights and responsibilities in the late 1990s. 
Critical Social Policy 18(4): 493-517. 
 
Dwyer P, McNeill J and Scullion L (2014) Conditionality Briefing: Disabled People. September 
2014. Available at: http://www.welfareconditionality.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Briefing_Disability_14.09.10_FINAL.pdf (accessed 01 October 2014). 
 
Dwyer P, and Wright S (2014) Universal credit, ubiquitous conditionality and its implications 
for social citizenship. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 22(1): 27-35. 
 
Elias N (2000) The Civilizing Process. London: Blackwell. 
 
Elias N (2001) The Society of Individuals. London: Continuum. 
 
Elias N (2008) The civilising of parents. In Kilminster R and Mennell S (Eds) Essays II: The 
Collected works of Norbert Elias, vol.15. Dublin: UCD Press, pp 14-40. 
 
Fergusson R and Yeates N (2013) Business, as usual: the policy priorities of the World Bank's 
discourses on youth unemployment, and the global financial crisis. Journal of International and 
Comparative Social Policy 29(1): 64-78. 
 
Fergusson R and Yeates N (2014) The normative and ideational foundations of international governmental organisationsǯ discourses on global youth unemployment policies. Policy & 
Politics 42(3): 439-458. 
 
Fletcher DR (1997) Evaluating special measures for the unemployed: some reflections on recent 
UK experience. Policy and Politics 25: 173-184. 
 
Flint J (2009) Subversive subjects and conditional, earned and denied citizenship. In  
Barnes M and Prior D (Eds.) Subversive Citizens - Power, Agency and Resistance in Public Services. 
Bristol: Policy Press, pp.83-98. 
 
Flint J and Powell R (2012) The English city riots of 2011, "Broken Britain" and the retreat into 
the present. Sociological Research Online, 17(3). Available at: 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/17/3/20.html 
 
Fraser N and Gordon L (1994) A genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a keyword of the US welfare 
state. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 19(2): 309-336. 
  
Freud D (2007) Reducing Dependency, Increasing Opportunity: Options for the Future of Welfare 
to Work. London: DWP. 
 
Furlong A (2006) Not a very NEET solution: representing problematic labour market 
transitions among early school-leavers. Work, Employment and Society 20: 553-569. 
 
Furlong A and Cartmel F (2007) Young People and Social Change: New Perspectives. 
Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
 
Goodwin J and O'Connor H (2005) Exploring complex transitions: Looking back at the "Golden 
Age" of from school to work. Sociology 39: 201-220. 
 
HM Government (2011a) Supporting youth employment: An overview of the Coalition 
Government's Approach. London: HM Government. 
 
22 
 
HM Government (2011b) Building Engagement, Building Futures: Our Strategy to Maximise the 
Participation of 16-24 Year Olds in Education, Training and Work. London: HM Government. 
 
Holmqvist M (2009) Medicalization of unemployment: individualizing issues as personal 
problems in the Swedish welfare state. Work, Employment and Society 23(3): 405-421. 
 
House of Commons Standard Note (2015) Housing Benefit: Withdrawing Entitlement from 
Young People. SN/SP/6473. 
 
Howker E and Malik S (2013) Jilted generation: How Britain has bankrupted its youth.  London: 
Icon Books. 
 
Jessop C and Humphrey A (2014) Generation Rent: Perceptions of the First-time Buyer Market. 
NatCen. 
 
Keep E and Mayhew K (2010) Moving beyond skills as a social and economic panacea.  
Work, Employment and Society 24(3) 656-577. 
 
Kennedy S (2014) Social Security Benefits and Tax Credits for People Under 25. London: House of 
Commons Library. 
 
Law A and Mooney G (2013) The decivilizing process and urban working-class youth in 
Scotland. Social Justice 38(4): 106-126. 
 
Lawler, S (2005) Disgusted subjects: The making of middle‐class identities. The Sociological 
Review 53(3): 429-446. 
 
Lawy R, Quinn J and Diment K ȋʹͲͲͻȌ Listening to Ǯthe thick bunchǯ: ȋmisȌunderstanding 
and (mis)representation of young people in jobs without training in the South West of England. 
British Journal of Sociology of Education 30(6), 741–755. 
 
Lindsay C and Houston D (2011) Fit for purpose? Welfare reform and challenges for health and 
labour market policy in the UK. Environment and Planning A 43 (3): 703-721. 
 
MacDonald R (2011) Youth transitions, unemployment and underemployment: Plus ça 
change, plus cǯest la même chose?. Journal of Sociology, 47 (4): 427-44. 
 
MacDonald C and Marston G (2005) Workfare as welfare: governing unemployment in the 
advanced neoliberal state. Critical Social Policy 25(3): 374-401. 
 
MacInnes T, Aldridge H, Bushe S, Kenway P and Tinson, A (2013) Monitoring poverty and Social 
Exclusion. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.  
 
McDowell L (2002) Transitions to work: masculine identities, youth inequality and labour 
market change. Gender, Place and Culture 9(1): 39-59. 
 
McQuaid R and Lindsay C (2005) The concept of employability. Urban Studies 42(3): 197–219. 
 
Patrick R (2014) Working on Welfare: Findings from a Qualitative Longitudinal Study into the 
Lived Experiences of Welfare Reform in the UK.  Journal of Social Policy 43: 705-725   
 
Pearson G (1983) Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears. London: MacMillan. 
 
Peck J (2001) Workfare States. New York: Guilford. 
23 
 
 
Peck J and Theodore N (2000) Beyond 'employability'. Cambridge Journal of Economics 
24 (6): 729-49. 
 
Pickard S (2014) "The Trouble with Young People These Days": "Deviant" Youth, the Popular 
Press and Politics in Contemporary Britain. In Bell E and Gilles C (eds) Labelling the Deviant. Othering and Exclusion in Britain from Past to Presentǯ, Revue Française de Civilisation 
Britannique (RFCB) – French Journal of British Studies. pp91-122 
 
Piven FF and Cloward RA (1971) Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare. New York: 
Vintage Books. 
 Pollock, G. ȋͳͻͻ͹Ȍ Ǯ)ndividualization and the Transition from Youth to Adulthoodǯ Young: Nordic 
Journal of Youth Research, 5 (1): 55-68. 
 
Roberts, S. (2011) Beyond "NEET" and "tidy" pathways: considering the "missing middle" of 
youth transition studies. Journal of Youth Studies 14 (1): 21-39. 
 
Riots Communities and Victims Panel (2012) After the riots: The final report of the Riots 
Communities and Victims Panel. London: Riots Communities and Victims Panel. London: Ministry 
of Justice. 
 
Rodger J (2008) Criminalising Social Policy: Anti-social behaviour in a de-civilised society. 
Cullompton: Willian. 
 
Schram SF (2000) In the clinic: the medicalization of welfare. Social Text 18: 81-107. 
 
Shildrick T, MacDonald R, Webster C and Garthwaite K (2012) Poverty and Insecurity: Life in 
Low-Pay, No-Pay Britain. Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
Shildrick T, MacDonald R, Furlong A, Roden J and Crow R (2012) Are "cultures of worklessness" 
passed down the generations? York: JRF. 
 
Skeggs, B (2004) Class, Self, Culture. London: Routledge. 
 
Skeggs, B. (2009) 'Haunted by the spectre of judgement: Respectability, value and affect in class 
relations' in Sveinsson, K. P. (Ed) Who Cares About the White Working Class. Runnymede Trust, 
pp 36-44. 
 
Slater T (2012) The Myth of ǲBroken Britainǳ: WelfareReform and the Production of Ignorance. 
Antipode 46 (4): 948-69. 
 
Smith D (2001) Norbert Elias and Modern Social Theory. London: Sage. 
 
Theodore N (2007) New Labour at work: long-term unemployment and the geography of 
opportunity. Cambridge Journal of Economics 31 (6): 927-939. 
 
Toynbee, P. and Walker, D. (2014) Caeron's Coup: How the Tories took Britain to the brink. 
London: Guardian Books.  
 
24 
 
Trickey H and Walker R (2001) Steps to compulsion within British labour market policies. In 
Lødemel I and Trickey H (2001) 'An Offer You Can't Refuse': Workfare in international 
perspective. Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 181-214. 
 
Thompson R (2011) Individualisation and social exclusion: the case of young 
people not in education, employment or training. Oxford Review of Education 37(6), 785-802. 
 
van Krieken R (2005) The "best interests of the child" and parental separation: on the "civilizing 
of parents". Modern Law Review 68(1): 25-48. 
 
van Reenan J  (2004) Active Labor Market Policies and the British New 
Deal for the Young Unemployed in Context. Available at  http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6754 
(accessed 15 September 2014). 
 
Vertigans, S (2015) Home from home: UK covilising offensives in residential childcare, Human 
Figurations, 4(1). Online journal: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11217607.0004.104 
 
Wacquant L (2008) Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Wacquant L (2013) Class, ethnicity and state in the making of marginality: revisiting Urban 
Outcasts. Dansk Sociologi, pp.33-47. Available  at: 
http://loicwacquant.net/assets/Papers/REVISITINGURBANOUTCASTS-Danish-article-
version.pdf (accessed 20 August 2014). 
 
Watts B, Fitzpatrick S, Bramley G and Watkins D (2014) Welfare sanctions and conditionality in 
the UK. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
  
Webster, D (2014) )ndependent review of Jobseeker’s Allowance ȋJSAȌ sanctions for claimants failing to take 
part in back-to-work schemes. Revised 13th January 2014. Available at: 
www.welfareconditionality.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Oakley-Review-D.Webster-Evidence-
rev.-13-Jan-2014.pdf (accessed 15 April 2015) 
 
Willetts D (2011) The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took Their Children's Future - And Why They 
Should Give it Back. London: Atlantic Books. 
 
Willis, P. (2014 [1977]) Learning to Labour. Farnham: Ashgate. 
 
Yates S, Harris A, Sabates R and Staff J(2011) Early occupational aspirations and fractured transitions: a study of entry into ǮNEETǯ status in the UK Journal of Social Policy 40 (3): 513-534. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures to insert 
 
Figure 1: Labour market reforms and unemployment levels 
 
 
26 
 
Figure 2: Qualifications among 16-24 year olds in seven LEP areas and England (2006-13) 
 
 
Source: Annual Population Survey  
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Figure 3: Employment status of young people aged 18-24, seven LEP areas and England 
(2005-13) 
Source: Annual Population Survey 
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